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THE TORT OF AIDING AND ADVISING?:
THE ATTORNEY EXCEPTION TO AIDING AND
ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
KEVIN BENNARDO*

Attorneys face a variety of ethical challenges. While doing the “right”
thing may not always be easy, it should always be clear. Rules of professional conduct demarcate the line between right and wrong in some
instances. Other areas, however, are left to common law (and judicial
interpretation) to develop. This article deals with one such area: whether
(and, if so, under what circumstances) an attorney may be held liable for
aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.
Part I of this article explores the traditional aiding and abetting
standard in tort law. Part II applies that standard to breach of fiduciary duty
liability. Next, Part III surveys case law of tort actions for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty by attorney-defendants, and Part IV
questions whether attorneys should have an affirmative duty to prevent
clients from breaching fiduciary duties. Finally, Part V applies public
policy to reach the conclusion that attorneys should not be given any
exception from liability when sued for aiding and abetting a client’s breach
of fiduciary duty.
I.

AIDING AND ABETTING STANDARD

The common law of torts imposes liability for aiding and abetting
another in commission of a wrongful act.1 The parameters of aiding and
abetting liability are laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts using a
three-prong test: (1) the aided party must commit tortious conduct; (2) the
aider must know that the aided party’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty;
and (3) the aider must give substantial assistance or encouragement to the
aided party.2
*
Law Clerk to the Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois; J.D., 2007, the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. The author
extends gratitude to Arthur Greenbaum for aiding and abetting in the preparation of this essay.
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 89, 89 (Mass. 1861) (“Any person who is
present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or exciting the same by words, gestures,
looks or signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances and approves the same, is in law
deemed to be an aider and abettor, and liable as principal.”).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). “For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the
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According to comment (d) to that section: “Advice or encouragement
to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is
known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser
as participation or physical assistance.”3 However, assistance can be so
slight so as to avoid liability; the factors to consider in determining liability
are: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the amount of assistance given
by the defendant; (3) the presence or absence of the defendant at the time of
the tort; (4) the defendant’s relation to the other; and (5) the defendant’s
state of mind.4
II. APPLICATION OF AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
STANDARD TO BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A fiduciary relationship is one in which “one person [called a ‘fiduciary’] is under a duty to act for the benefit of another [called a ‘beneficiary’]
on matters within the scope of the relationship.”5 Common examples of
fiduciary relationships include guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-client.6 The fiduciary’s obligation to act for the benefit of another is
known as a “fiduciary duty,” and breach of that duty causes the fiduciary to
be liable to the beneficiary.7
Combining aiding and abetting liability with this breach of fiduciary
duty liability creates a straightforward result: one who knowingly provides
substantial assistance or encouragement to another in breaching a fiduciary
duty is liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.8 As
explored above, providing advice or encouragement satisfies the substantial
assistance prong.9 Therefore, it follows that an attorney who counsels his
or her client to breach a fiduciary duty should be liable for aiding and
abetting that breach of fiduciary duty.
Aiding in a breach of fiduciary duty may also be aiding in the commission of a crime. For example, an attorney may advise a trustee on how to
siphon funds from a beneficiary. Other times, however, a breach of fiduciary duty is not criminal, but is tortious. For instance, a tortious breach of
other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself.” Id.
3. Id. § 876 cmt. d.
4. Id.
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
6. Id.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Bird v. Lynn, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 422 (Ky. 1850), *2 (stating that liability for
encouraging tortious activity should be imposed when the encouragement has a direct relation to
the tortious conduct and was intended to produce it).
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fiduciary duty occurs when an agent forgoes their principal’s interest and
instead pursues their own self-interest, or when a partner takes on a client
on the side rather than giving the benefit to the partnership.10 If an attorney
advised that agent or that partner as to how to breach their fiduciary duty
with greater stealth or success, that attorney would have aided and abetted
in a breach of fiduciary duty. This begs the question of whether the attorney, who owes a fiduciary duty to his or her own clients, should be liable to
their client’s beneficiary.
III. RECENT CASE LAW
Two approaches are developing regarding the emerging area of aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in tort law: (1) creating an explicit
exception that safeguards attorneys from liability, and (2) employing less
straight-forward means to reach the same end.
A. AN EXPLICIT EXCEPTION FOR ATTORNEYS
The most prominent decision recognizing an explicit exception for
attorneys is that of the Oregon Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Schrock. 11
Reynolds and Shrock purchased two parcels of land together.12 Shrock
sued Reynolds, and the lawsuit was settled.13 Shrock’s lawyer, Markley,
took part in the negotiations and drafting of the settlement agreement. 14
Under the settlement agreement, Reynolds was to transfer his shares in one
of the two properties to Shrock and the parties would sell the other property
together, with Reynolds receiving the proceeds.15 If the sale of the second
property did not amount to $500,000, Schrock would pay Reynolds the
difference and Reynolds would be given a security interest in the first
property to ensure payment.16
As agreed, Reynolds transferred his interest in the first property to
Shrock.17 Markley advised Schrock that nothing stopped her from selling
the first property before the sale of the second property, thereby making it
impossible for Reynolds to claim a security interest in it.18 Schrock, with
10. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Bigelow, 100 N.W. 723, 724-26 (N.D. 1904) (finding
impermissible self-dealing on the part of a real estate agent who surreptitiously sold his principal’s
land to himself for less than an outside buyer was willing to pay).
11. 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006).
12. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1064.
18. Id.
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Markley’s aid, secretly sold the first property before the sale of the second
property.19 Under advisement by Markley, Schrock then revoked her
consent to the sale of the second property because of an alleged breach of
the settlement agreement by Reynolds.20 Since the first property had
already been sold to an innocent third party, Reynolds was unable to take a
security interest in it, and was also unable to sell the jointly owned second
property.21
Reynolds sued Schrock for breach of fiduciary duty and Markley for
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.22 The lawsuit against
Schrock was settled, leaving Markley as the sole defendant.23 The court
held that summary judgment in the attorney’s favor was proper, recognizing
an exception for attorneys from liability for aiding and abetting a client’s
breach of fiduciary duty.24 However, the exception created for attorneys is
not unlimited: For a third party to hold an attorney liable for aiding and
abetting a client in breach of a fiduciary duty, the burden is on the third
party to prove that the lawyer acted outside the scope of the lawyer-client
relationship.25 This exception extends liability to attorney conduct that is
unrelated to the representation of a client (even if the person is a client), in
the attorney’s own self-interest, or within the “crime or fraud” exception to
the attorney-client privilege.26
The court cited the Restatement for support: “One who otherwise
would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within
the limits of a privilege.”27 The court determined that such a “privilege
from liability” was proper in the attorney-client setting because the
attorney-client relationship is “integral to the legal system itself.”28 Since
clients need lawyers in many situations, the court felt that providing
lawyers protection from certain aiding and abetting liability would help
ensure that attorneys focused on pursuing their clients’ interests rather than
their own self-interests in avoiding liability.29
This decision distinguished itself from, and seemingly greatly narrowed, previous Oregon case law. Previously, attorneys had been held
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1069–72.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1066 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1979)).
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068–69.
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liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in Granewich v.
Harding.30 In distinguishing the cases, the Oregon Supreme Court noted
that the attorneys in Granewich acted outside the scope of the attorneyclient relationship.31 While the court in Granewich did accept as true the
allegations in the complaint pleading that the attorneys acted outside the
scope of their legitimate employment, the court did not state that this fact
was determinative to its decision, declaring instead that the defendants’
“status as lawyers is irrelevant.”32
Reynolds was not the first decision to recognize an attorney exception;
a Texas appellate court had done so previously in Alpert v. Crain, Caton &
James, P.C.33 Since the complaint in that case did not allege that the
defendant-lawyers committed any “independent tortious act or misrepresentation” outside of the representation of the client, the court barred the nonclient plaintiff from bringing an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
cause of action against the attorneys.34 No published Texas decision has
imposed liability on a lawyer for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of
fiduciary duty.35
While not an “aiding and abetting” case by name, the Supreme Court
of Hawaii approved of the Reynolds decision in Kahala Royal Corp. v.
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, LLP.36 The court in Kahala cited
Reynolds by analogy to support the proposition that attorneys’ actions
within the scope of the lawyer-client relationship fell within the litigation
privilege when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-lawyers were liable
for “tortious inducement of breach of fiduciary duty.”37 The “litigation
privilege,” a less expansive privilege than the full attorney-client privilege
recognized in Reynolds, protects an attorney from liability to his or her
client’s civil litigation adversary if the act of the attorney occurred in the
course of the attorney’s representation and is related to the civil action.38

30. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
31. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1065.
32. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 795.
33. 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005).
34. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 407.
35. See Jessica Palvino, Aiding-and-Abetting Liability: Is Privity Making a Comeback?, 70
TEX. B.J. 52, 53 (2007) (noting that although Texas law recognizes a cause of action for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, Texas courts “have shown reluctance to extend this cause
of action to attorneys whose only actions were to represent their clients”).
36. 151 P.3d 732 (Haw. 2007).
37. Kahala, 151 P.3d at 751–52, 752 n.19. “[T]ortious inducement of breach of fiduciary
duty” is a plaintiff-created and undefined cause of action that, based on its designation, appears to
be similar—if not identical—to aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
38. Id. at 750.
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B. A LESS-THAN-EXPLICIT EXCEPTION FOR ATTORNEYS?
Case law on attorney liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is limited, but varied (as to whether the tort exists, its components,
and its application to attorneys).39 Unlike the Reynolds decision discussed
above, other decisions have declined to explicitly carve out an exception for
attorneys.
Courts seem to disfavor extending liability to attorneys acting to further
their clients’ interests.40 While considering a case involving accountants,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota balanced public policy to narrow the
liability of professionals (including attorneys) in aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty cases without explicitly adopting another prong of
inquiry.41 Focusing on the plaintiff’s pleadings, the court determined that
the claim had not been pled with enough particularity—alleging neither
“actual knowledge” nor “substantial assistance” by the defendants.42 Despite imposing this heightened pleading standard for the first time, the court
did not remand the case to permit the plaintiff to amend her complaint, but
rather held that the plaintiff had failed to state a colorable claim, and
awarded summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.43
A recent decision on the topic, Alexander v. Anstine,44 unfortunately
sheds no new light on the issue. Because it determined that the attorney’s
client had not breached a fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court of Colorado
“save[d] for another day the question of whether an attorney can ever be
liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty to a non-client.” 45
The Colorado Court of Appeals, both in the lower decision in that case and

39. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6.6 (5th ed.
2000) (reviewing cases on attorneys’ liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty).
40. See Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(finding that even though an Illinois court has never found an attorney liable for aiding and
abetting his client in a commission of a tort, a per se bar preventing such tort actions is not
appropriate); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Mass. 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show
that defendant-attorney not only knew of the breach of fiduciary duty, but actively participated to
such an extent that no reasonable claim of good faith could be made); Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v.
Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 774-75 (S.D. 2002) (noting that an attorney who merely acts as a
“scrivener” for a client has not given “substantial assistance” to the client’s breach of fiduciary
duty and therefore cannot be held liable).
41. Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187 (Minn. 1999) “[I]n cases
where aiding and abetting liability is alleged against professionals, [the court] will narrowly and
strictly interpret the elements of the claim and require the plaintiff to plead with particularity facts
establishing each of [the] elements.” Id.
42. Id. at 187-89.
43. Id. at 189 n.4.
44. 152 P.3d 497 (Colo. 2007).
45. Alexander, 152 P.3d at 503.
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in another case, had previously recognized that an aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit could lie against an attorney.46
IV. FIRST, DO NO HARM; SECOND, PREVENT HARM?
A. AND NOW, A WORD FROM THE COMMENTATORS
Academic discussion has arisen regarding whether attorneys have an
affirmative duty to prevent their clients from causing harm in the form of a
breach of fiduciary duty. The argument over whether an attorney must,
must not, or may disclose to a client’s beneficiary that the client is acting
inappropriately with regard to the fiduciary relationship presupposes the
basic notion that the attorney should not contribute to the client’s
malfeasance.
Professor Hazard advocates that where an attorney’s client is a
fiduciary of a third party, that third party assumes “derivative client” status
and the actual client is the “primary client.”47 Under this model, the
attorney effectively has two clients: the primary client (the actual client who
hired the attorney) and the derivative client (the beneficiary of the primary
client’s fiduciary duty).48 Since the primary client (as a fiduciary) is obligated to work in the interest of the derivative client (as a beneficiary), the
attorney is as well.49 Three consequences of this primary-derivative client
model follow: (1) the lawyer’s obligation to avoid participation in his or her
client’s fraud is engaged by a more sensitive trigger than usual;50 (2) the
lawyer must ensure that the fiduciary-primary client volunteers complete
and truthful information to the third party-derivative client;51 and (3) the
lawyer has a duty to disobey instructions that would wrongfully harm the

46. See Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 256–58 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a
jury’s apportionment of one percent of the fault to the attorneys for aiding and abetting client’s
breach of fiduciary duty); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308-10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)
(denying recovery because the attorney had no knowledge that he was assisting his client in
breaching a fiduciary duty).
47. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 2.7
(3d ed. Supp. 2007).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) forbids an attorney to counsel a client to
commit fraudulent activity, but allows an attorney to discuss the legal ramifications of a proposed
course of conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2004). Under the derivative
client model an attorney would be provided less leeway, and borderline advice would be apt to be
categorized as impermissible counseling.
51. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 47, § 2.7. Disclosure of this usually privileged
information by the attorney is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id.
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third party-derivative client (because a client is not permitted to use an
attorney to harm the client’s beneficiary).52
Professor Hazard rejects the opposite view,espoused by ABA Formal
Opinion 94-380.53 The Formal Opinion of the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility states that where an attorney’s
client is a fiduciary of another, the lawyer has no more duty to the client’s
beneficiary than to any third party.54 Not only would disclosure of certain
information by an attorney be non-mandatory (which is counter to Hazard’s
view), such disclosures to the client’s beneficiary would be prohibited as if
the disclosures were to any third party.55
One commentator has struck a third path, arguing that the attorney
should be able to exercise discretion and should be liable neither to a
client’s beneficiary for non-disclosure of the client’s malfeasance, nor to the
client if the lawyer decides to disclose such information.56 Professor Tuttle
argues that the ABA’s approach neglects to explain why an attorney should
treat his or her client’s beneficiary as a stranger and ignores the need for a
more nuanced approach.57 Tuttle’s major qualm with Hazard’s approach is
that it does not account for conflicting interests, which may arise where the
client has multiple beneficiaries (or in some cases where there is only a
single beneficiary).58 Tuttle seems to misconceive Hazard’s approach,
arguing that it would require the consent of both “joint-clients” and would
give both the fiduciary-primary client and the beneficiary-derivative client
the power to discharge the attorney (which, of course, would be
unworkable).59
Professor Hazard accounts for such problems however, stating that
where the client is openly adverse to the “beneficiary,” the joint client
model is not viable.60 Examples of such clear cases arise: (1) where the
lawyer is retained to represent the fiduciary in litigation concerning the
performance of the fiduciary duty; (2) where the lawyer is hired to represent
the fiduciary in negotiating the terms and conditions of his or her office (the
duties and compensation of the fiduciary, for example); and (3) where a

52. Id.
53. Id. § 2.7 n.3.
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 380 (1994).
55. Id.
56. Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 889 (1994).
57. Id. at 905–06.
58. Id. at 912–14.
59. Id. at 914–16.
60. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 33 (1987).
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lawyer with no prior involvement is hired to negotiate for the termination or
reformation of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship.61 However, Hazard
argues that in the “normal legal relationship” between fiduciary and
beneficiary the fiduciary is fulfilling his or her duties and therefore the joint
client model poses no such problems.62 However, if the properly
functioning fiduciary relationship collapses and becomes antagonistic, the
lawyer would only be able to represent the interests of his or her true (or
“primary”) client.63
B. IS MY BROTHER’S BROTHER NOT ALSO MY BROTHER?
Traditionally, an attorney could only be liable in tort to his or her own
client. However, inroads have reconstructed this maxim, and an attorney
has certain responsibilities to third parties, particularly when the third party
has a relationship with the attorney’s client.64 In the situation where a
lawyer’s client is also a fiduciary, the lawyer may have a duty to prevent the
client from breaching his or her own duties to the non-client.65
While argument exists as to whether an attorney is required to prevent
a client’s breach of fiduciary duty,66 a lawyer owes a duty of care to a
nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer’s client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary
acting primarily to perform similar functions for the nonclient;
(b) the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is
necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the representation to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by
the client to the nonclient, where (i) the breach is a crime or fraud
or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach;
(c) the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of
the lawyer’s obligations to the client.67
As laid out in subsections (a) and (c), this duty does not attach in all
circumstances in which the client is a fiduciary—only those in which the

61. Id. at 33–35.
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id. at 38–39.
64. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 47, § 4.6.
65. Id.
66. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing whether attorneys have an affirmative duty to
prevent their clients from breaching their fiduciary duties).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(4) (2000).

94

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:85

client exercises substantial power over another (as in the case of a guardian
or trustee) and the client’s beneficiary is not reasonably able to protect its
own rights.68
Subsection (b)(i) furthers the crime-fraud exception, requiring the
attorney to act to prevent or rectify a client’s breach of fiduciary duty that is
criminal or fraudulent.69 Subsection (b)(ii) requires the same action when
the lawyer lends assistance to the breach.70 However, according to subsection (d), if taking such action would substantially impair the performance of
the attorney’s representation of the client, the lawyer has no obligation to
act.71 A lawyer is also excused from the obligation if such action would
cause him or her to breach professional rules.72
This duty requires attorneys in certain circumstances to clean up their
own mess when they have assisted a client’s breach of fiduciary duty, or
prevent a mess from being made when the client’s breach of fiduciary duty
would be illegal or fraudulent. Such affirmative duties imply a fundamental
duty not to aid in a client’s breach of fiduciary duty at the offset. While
imposing a duty of disclosure on the attorney could arguably create conflict
of interest problems and chill clients’ willingness to communicate frankly
with their attorneys, those same problems do not arise by merely barring the
attorney from advising or participating in a client’s breach of fiduciary
duty.
V. THOUGHTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND A WORD ON PUBLIC POLICY
Despite courts’ conclusions to the contrary, no solid foundation exists
to create an exception for attorneys from liability for aiding and abetting a
client’s breach of fiduciary duty. Whether created explicitly or by “strict
interpretation” of the elements of the tort, such an exception is
inappropriate.73
In protecting attorneys from lawsuits alleging aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty through the imposition of a heightened pleading
standard, requiring the plaintiff to lay out his or her claim in more rigorous

68. Id. § 51(4)(a), (c).
69. Id. § 51(4)(b)(i).
70. Id. § 51(4)(b)(ii).
71. Id. § 51(4)(d).
72. Id. § 51 cmt. h.
73. One positive note is that no court has created an unqualified exception from liability for
attorneys. The exception is limited by the attorney’s scope of representation. Attorneys acting
outside of the attorney-client relationship may claim no protection, as they are most likely acting
for their own benefit (either directly or indirectly, as through the generation of more fees).
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detail in the complaint is especially inappropriate.74 Pleading with such
particularity is usually reserved for situations in which even the allegation
of the tortious activity could damage a potentially innocent defendant (for
example, fraud or mistake).75 Allegations of aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty do not rise to the same level of damage in accusation. Any
charge of tortious activity inevitably causes some harm to the defendant,
but this particular cause of action does no more harm to a professional
reputation than other torts, such as malpractice, which do not command
heightened levels of specificity at the pleading stage.
Applying aiding and abetting liability to breaches of fiduciary duties
creates clear liability for those who assist in such breaches.76 Unless a
wealth of close cases exist in which an attorney’s loyalties would be
divided between zealously representing a client and protecting him- or
herself from a lawsuit, no beneficial policy exists that justifies creating an
exception for attorneys who assist clients in breaching a fiduciary duty.
Attorneys who aid or advise clients in perpetrating frauds or engaging in
illegal activity may be held liable for their actions, and indeed the attorneyclient privilege is not available for communications regarding the fraud or
crime.77 The reasoning behind such a rule is that society rightfully wishes
to discourage attorneys from making such suggestions to clients.78 The
same rationale applies to advising clients to breach fiduciary duties. Since

74. See Witman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187 (Minn. 1999)
(requiring plaintiffs to plead facts with particularity when attempting to impose aiding and
abetting liability on professionals).
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”).
76. The common law of agency is helpful by analogy in this area (especially given that
agents are fiduciaries of their principals). The Restatement of Agency states that “[a] person who,
without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his
principal is subject to liability to the principal.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312
(1958). Comment (d) to that section makes clear that liability may be enforced through a tort
action against the party that assisted in the violation of the duty. Id. § 312 cmt. d. Comment (a)
states that privileges to aid an agent in breaching a duty to his principal are “rare,” and uses the
parent-child privilege as the only example: A parent may assist a child in breaching a duty to the
child’s principal. Id. § 312 cmt. a.
An attorney’s privilege to aid his or her client in breaching a fiduciary duty is based in
protecting societal good, by fostering the attorney-client relationship and strengthening the legal
system. Such “benefit of society” privileges should be extended cautiously, for these privileges
have no specific beneficiaries. However, those who are harmed by the privilege—the parties to
whom the breached fiduciary duty was owed—are easily identifiable.
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. f (2000)
(stating that lawyers are subject to the same liability as non-lawyers, subject to certain exceptions); 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVID. § 95 (6th ed. 2006) (“[I]t
would be a perversion of justice to extend [the attorney-client privilege] to the client who seeks
advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme.”).
78. MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 77, § 95.
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such advice is to be discouraged, attorneys who proffer it should be held
liable to the extent they cause harm.

